اخباری محمد (1386). «طراحی مکانیسم؛ پاسخی به پرسش‌های بسیار»، نشریة روند اقتصادی، ش 36.
معینی، شهرام و محسن رنانی (1389). «مسئلة داوری در حقوق مالکیت؛ صورت‌بندی، طراحی مکانیسم و استخراج تابع بهترین عکس‌العمل در چهارچوب نظریة بازی»، فصل‌نامة اقتصاد تطبیقی، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، س 1، ش 1.
واریان، هال (1378). تحلیل اقتصاد خرد، ترجمة رضا حسینی، تهران: نشر نی.
هادوی‌نیا، علی‌اصغر (1382). انسان اقتصادی از دیدگاه اسلام، پژوهشگاه فرهنگ و اندیشه.
Abowd, John (1990). “Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?”, Indusrial and Labor Relations review, No.43.
Arrow, K. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values, T. Wiley, New York.
Cyert, Richard and James March (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Gibbard, A. (1973). “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”, Econometrica, No. 41.
Gibbons, Robert and Kevin J. Murphy (1992). “Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Political Economy, No. 100.
Gibbons, Robert and Michael Powell (2008a). Influence-Cost Theories of the Firm, Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
Gibbons, Robert and Michael Powell (2008b). conomic Theories of Internal Organization: Pricing, Politics, and Path-Dependence, Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
Gibbons, Robert, (2005). “Incentives between Firms (and Within)”, Management Science, No. 51.
Gintis, H and A. Mandel (2012). The Dynamics of Walrasian General Equilibrium: Theory and Application, Sorbonne University Paris.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983). “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem”, Econometrica.
Holmstrom, Bengt (1982). “Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspective”, In Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics, Republished in Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999)
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1987). “The Firm as an Incentive System”, American Economic Review, No: 84.
Hume, D. A. (1740). Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, OxFord.
Hurwicz, L. (1960). “Optimality and Informaational E±ciency in Resourc Allocation Processes”, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Arrow, K., S. Karlin and P. Suppes ed., Stanford University Press, Stan- ford.
Kahn, Charles and Peter Sherer (1990). “Coningent Pay and Managerial Performance?”, Indusrial and Labor Relations review, No. 43.
Laffont, J. J. and D. Martimort (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press.
Lazear, Edward (1979). “Why is there mandatory retirement?”, Journal of Political Economy, No. 59.
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic, Oxford University Press.
Maskin, E. (1999). “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality”, Reveiw of Economic Studies, No. 23.
Mirrlees, J (1974). “Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty”, In M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S.Wu (eds.), Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Murphy, Kevin J. (1985). “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Accounting and Economic, No.7.
Myerson, R. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design”, Mathematics of Operations Research.
Smith, A. (1776). The Wealth of Nations, The Modern Library, New York.
Wicksell, K. (1986). “Finanz theoretische Untersuchungen und das Steuerwesen Schweden's”, Jena, Germany, No. 43.
)