The Political Economy of Oil Democracy and Strategic Behavior of State-Society

Document Type : Scientific-research

Authors

1 Shiraz University

2 Department of Economics, Human Science Faculty, Yasouj University

10.30465/ce.2024.49985.1983

Abstract

The influence of the type of political structure on the emergence of the resource curse is one of the most important topics that have been discussed about this phenomenon. Most researches have concluded that democracy can prevent the emergence of the resource curse, and vice versa, dictatorial and autocratic systems provide the conditions for the emergence of the resource curse. Of course, the reverse of this relationship has also been discussed, that is, the curse of resources can be an obstacle to democracy and instead a source of dictatorship. Oil revenues in particular and natural resources in general have changed and complicated the institutional relations between the state and the society. The interaction between state and society in oil countries is fluctuating between tyranny and oil democracy. Using two methods of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and game theory, the present research shows how natural resource revenues interact with political stability and the voice and accountability, and influence inefficiency and minimize the possibilities of realizing democracy in these countries. Based on this, the oil countries must simultaneously reduce their dependence on oil revenues and, on the other hand, improve structural and institutional reforms.

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History

  • Receive Date: 13 September 2024
  • Revise Date: 17 October 2024
  • Accept Date: 20 October 2024

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