A Comparison between Theoretical Solutions and Experimental Results of Gains Allocation in Cooperative Games

Document Type : a

Authors

1 Associate professor, Economics Faculty, University of Tehran

2 PhD Candidate of Economics, Imam Sadiq University

3 Candidate of Economics, Imam Sadiq University

Abstract

The wide range of Individual choices is formed in the context of cooperative games and team working. The gains distribution resulted from such coalition is very important. Considering that the general framework of gains allocation in this game is different from non-cooperative games, variety of solutions have been proposed for this purpose in game theory. The goal of this paper is, firstly, to compare this solution with the answers that obtained from an experimental survey, and secondly, to evaluate the level of fairness of theoretical solution based on the survey participants’ perception of fair gains allocation. The findings of this study suggest that ‘nucleolus’ and ‘egalitarian’ solutions have the most similarity to individual’s choices, respectively. Moreover ‘nucleolus’, ‘egalitarian’ and ‘Shapley value’ solutions have been considered as fair solutions by the survey participants.

 

Keywords

References

 
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Journal of Iranian Economic Issues
Volume 1, Issue 2
March 2015
Pages 117-134

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History

  • Receive Date: 12 May 2014
  • Revise Date: 10 June 2014
  • Accept Date: 06 August 2014

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