مقدمه‌ای بر اقتصاد رفتاری: مفهوم،‌ روش‌شناسی و شیوه‌های استخراج ترجیحات

نوع مقاله: علمی-ترویجی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دورة دکتری اقتصاد، دانشگاه مازندران

2 استادیار گروه اقتصاد نظری، دانشگاه مازندران

3 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد اقتصاد، دانشگاه مازندرانm

4 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد اقتصاد، دانشگاه مازندران

چکیده

یکی از مهم‌ترین مباحث در نظریه‌پردازی علم اقتصاد، انسان اقتصادی و ویژگی‌‌های رفتاری اوست. اقتصاد به‌ مثابة علمی انسانی، برای مدل‌‌سازی، پیش‌بینی، سیاست‌گذاری و تمام کارکرد‌های خود نیازمند شناختی مناسب از انسان، بسان محور تصمیم‌گیری‌های اقتصادی است. جریان اصلی اقتصاد و به‌ویژه اقتصاد نئوکلاسیکی، بعد از جان ‌‌استوارت ‌‌میل با قبول برخی اصول، مانند حداکثرسازی نفع شخصی و رفتار عقلایی، بررسی‌‌های انسان‌شناسانه را نادیده گر‌فته است. عده‌‌ای از اقتصاددانان این فروض انعطاف‌ناپذیر را علت برخی ناکامی‌‌های اقتصاد در زمینه‌‌های عملی دانسته‌اند. اقتصاد رفتاری بر آن است تا این خلأ را با روش‌‌های گوناگون پوشش دهد. امروزه اقتصاد رفتاری با کمک دانش و روش‌های پژوهش در علم روان‌شناسی پیشرفت‌‌ کرده است. بازی‌‌های رفتاری یکی از روش‌‌های پژوهش در اقتصاد رفتاری است. در این تحقیق تلاش می‌‌شود تا افزون ‌بر بررسی روش‌شناسی اقتصاد رفتاری، مهم‌ترین و پرکاربردترین بازی‌‌های رفتاری معرفی شوند. معمای زندانی، کالای عمومی، اولتیماتوم، دیکتاتور، اعتماد، مبادله ـ هدیه، و بازی تنبیه شخص ثالث در این پژوهش بررسی می‌شوند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

An Introduction to Behavioral Economics;Concept, Methodology and the Ways for Extracting the Preferences

نویسندگان [English]

  • habib ansari samani 1
  • alireza pourfaraj 2
  • masoud zareh 3
  • abass amini 4
چکیده [English]

Homo economicus and economical characteristics of human behavior is one of the most important topics in economic theory. For modeling, forecasting, policy making and all its functions, economics, as a human science, requires a proper understanding of man as the axis of economic decision-makings. At least after a point in history of economics with the acceptance of principles such as maximizing self-interest and rational behavior, mainstream economics, especially neoclassical economics has ignored the anthropological studies. Some economists believe that these inflexible assumptions are the causes of practical economic failures. Behavioral economics aims to solve this problem through various methods. Today, behavioral economics has made great progress with the help of knowledge and research methods of Psychology. Behavioral games are one of the research methods of behavioral economics. This paper attempts to study the methodology of behavioral economics through the introduction of the most important and widely used behavioral games. The seven games discussed are prisoners’ dilemma (PD), public goods, ultimatum, dictator, trust, gift exchange, and third party punishment.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Behavioral economics
  • Behavioral Games
  • Psychological economics
  • Homo economicus
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